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TOO MUCH OIL
a

Reyer Gerlagh1,a
Tilburg University, Netherlands

ABSTRACT
Fear for oil exhaustion and its consequences on economic growth has been a driver of a rich
literature on exhaustible resources from the 1970s onwards. But our view on oil has
remarkably changed and we now worry how we should constrain climate change damages
associated with oil and other fossil fuel use. In this climate change debate, economists have
pointed to a green paradox: when policy makers stimulate the development of non-carbon
energy sources to (partly) replace fossil fuels in the future, oil markets may anticipate a
future reduction in demand and increase current supply. The availability of ‘green’
technologies may increase damages. The insight comes from the basic exhaustible resource
model. We reproduce the green paradox and to facilitate discussion differentiate between a
weak and a strong version, related to short-term and long-term effects, respectively. Then
we analyze the green paradox in 2 standard modifications of the exhaustible resource
model. We find that increasing fossil fuel extraction costs counteracts the strong green
paradox, while with imperfect energy substitutes both the weak and strong green paradox
may vanish.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the 21st century, mankind has to solve two problems closely intertwined and both fundamental
to economic prosperity for centuries to come. The first problem concerns the secure supply of
energy when the era of cheap oil will come to an end. The 1973 oil crisis, which was a prolonged
interruption in the otherwise reliable and growing supply of cheap oil, exposed world’s
dependence. The interruption was temporary, though, and overall cheap oil has been a corner
stone for worldwide economic growth during the second half of the 20th century. But the oil crisis
had put exhaustible resources on the map of economic theory and a rich literature has developed.
The second problem concerns the containment of global climate change, a phenomenon that is
already observed in rapidly melting glaciers and the Greenland, Antarctic and polar ice-cap.
Climate change threatens to destroy vast eco-systems, raise sea levels substantially and alter our
world in yet unknown directions.
Economists have noted an unexpected interaction between the two problems. When with
good intentions policy makers set up green policies to develop energy sources that may substitute
for oil in the long run, they may enhance climate change problems, rather than mitigate them
(Strand 2008 and Hoel 2008). The argument is intuitive. Oil suppliers, when anticipating the
development of an alternative competitive energy source, will bring forward the sales of their
resource, and thus increase current emissions, to protect their revenues. This phenomenon is
called the green paradox (Sinn 2008).2
This paper discusses the typical resource model that underlies the green paradox, and
analyzes some common extensions and studies whether the green paradox remains robust. The
need for an extension of the simple model is based on two observations. First, there is too much
oil plus other fossil fuels, in the sense that we cannot allow the exploitation of all nonconventional oil and coal reserves to progress unchecked. That is, if we want to maintain a safe
climate threshold. Second, there are no ideal non-carbon energy sources that can substitute for oil
and other fossil fuels at unlimited supply and constant marginal costs. Instead, many non-carbon
energy sources have decreasing returns to scale and are imperfect substitutes. The implication of
both observations is that substantial market interventions are needed to prevent the use of too
much oil and other fossil fuels. The silver lining, though, is that the same features make the
appearance of a green paradox less likely.
The basic model that combines the dynamics of exhaustible resource markets with climate
change damages was analyzed by Sinclair (1992) who noted that carbon taxes as such would not
necessarily lead to the decrease of emissions associated with fossil fuel use: “the key decision of
those lucky enough to own oil-wells is not so much how much to produce as when to extract it.”
Thus, he reasoned, as climate policy should aim to delay the extraction of oil, the main target for
a tax on fossil fuels should be to shift supply from the present to the future. That is, the price
wedge of a climate tax, when measured relative to the rent that the oil-well owners receive,
should decrease over time. Under the optimal carbon tax, owners could increase their net present
value rent by delaying supply.
Ulph and Ulph (1994) added to the above model the notion that the marginal damages
associated with carbon dioxide emissions, that is, the use of fossil fuels, is not constant over time,
but can be expected to follow a hump-shaped curve. The higher the atmospheric CO2
concentrations, the higher the additional damages associated with an extra unit emitted. Based on
2

The green paradox can also occur for other climate change policies such as announced carbon pricing.
Anticipation of future reductions in demand for oil and other fossil fuels will drive the resource owners to
bring forward their supply (Sinn 2008, Di Maria et al. 2008, Eichner and Pethig 2009, Smulders et al.
2009). In this paper, though, we will focus on the development of cheaper energy substitutes for oil and
fossil fuels.
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this argument, Ulph and Ulph showed that as the resource stock of fossil fuels is exploited and
builds up the atmospheric stock of CO2, marginal damages would increase and carbon taxes
should increase in parallel, to be reduced at the later stage when the climate system would slowly
return to the natural state.
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) further developed the analysis by including rising extraction
costs for fossil fuels and the existence of a substitute energy source, a so-called backstop
available at constant marginal costs and at infinite supply. The backstop is important to the
analysis as it ensures that economic production is possible without use of the exhaustible
resource. It offers an outside option to the buyer, and thereby prevents the seller from setting
prices too high. The extraction costs are important because they capture the understanding that
the cumulative supply of fossil fuels, and thereby cumulative CO2 emissions, is not only
determined by the geography of the resource, but also depends on the price that the fossil fuel
owners receive for their resource. Nonetheless, Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) conclude that optimal
climate policy will not affect cumulative fossil fuel use, but will mainly shift part of current fossil
fuel use to the very long term, when the atmospheric CO2 concentrations have passed their peak.
The above literature thus established some of the basic mechanisms that have to be taken into
account when one thinks about optimal carbon pricing jointly with the working of the oil market.
The analytical model typically considers one global resource market with cooperation between
countries for climate policy. The assumption is a far cry from practice, where countries are
accepted to have different responsibilities for climate policy, and where climate policy is feared
to interfere with countries’ competitiveness. Policy makers worry that carbon pricing will push
out energy-intensive firms as these will move to countries without high carbon prices or strict
regulations. The reduction in domestic CO2 emissions may then partly be offset by an increase in
foreign emissions. This phenomenon, dubbed carbon leakage, has been studied widely both in the
theoretical setting (Copeland and Taylor 2005, Di Maria and van der Werf, 2008) and through
applied numerical simulations (see Gerlagh and Kuik 2008 for an overview).
Policy makers interpret carbon leakage as a signal that domestic carbon pricing will be an
expensive and ineffective climate policy. They look for an alternative green policy without the
competitiveness costs: the development of an energy substitute that would in the long term be
cheap enough to drive out oil and other fossil fuels as main energy sources. The prospect is a
double dividend in which a new clean energy source reduces dependency on oil and other fossil
fuels, and at the same time decreases climate change damages. The double benefits would come
without the fear of firm relocation and associated job losses. It is this perspective that we will
analyze in this paper. We will abstract from carbon pricing policy, and focus on the development
of a non-carbon energy substitute and its effect on energy markets and climate change.
Specifically, we ask when the green paradox arises. Under which conditions will cheaper
non-carbon energy sources increase current emissions and climate change damages, or
alternatively, when will it mitigate the damages. To be more precise, we distinguish between a
weak and a strong green paradox. A weak green paradox arises when (the anticipation of) a
cheaper clean energy technology increases current emissions, as in Smulders et al. (2009). A
weak green paradox need not be the main concern though. Current emissions may increase, but if
future emissions sufficiently decrease, in the long term, climate change may be less severe. A
strong green paradox arises when the cheaper clean energy technology increases cumulative
damages associated with emissions as well, evaluated at the net present value. The weak green
paradox refers to an immediate effect. The strong green paradox refers to an aggregate welfare
effect. One cannot directly derive from the analysis whether a cheaper non-carbon energy source
increases or decreases welfare. But for a feel of the welfare effects, let us assume that there are
generic policies in place that correct the innovation market in such way that the development of
new technologies is at an efficient level, insofar the effects on production and income are
concerned. In such a context, we may say that if a cheaper non-carbon energy source decreases
climate change damages, the innovation has a positive externality and it deserves some extra
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stimulus. If, however, climate change damages increase as in the strong green paradox, then the
energy innovation has a negative externality and an extra stimulus is unwarranted.
The analysis presented in this paper is complementary to Hoel (2009), who studies a
similar question in a two-period model, whereas we will employ an infinite horizon model. The
two-period timeframe allows Hoel (2009) to find a full analytical solution and a complete
characterization of how different assumptions on parameters affect the green paradox. Our
infinite horizon model more naturally fits the very long-term nature of the problem. The price we
pay for our long horizon is that we put more restrictions on various parameters.
The set up of the paper is as follows. Below we start with a basic check on the scientific
understanding of how much oil and fossil fuels we can use without risking dangerous climate
change. That is, we relate climate change to global fossil fuel economic reserves and resources.
Thereafter, we analyze and compare three base models of fossil fuel extraction and climate
change damages. The first model has a fixed resource, constant extraction costs, and a backstop
technology. This model is closest to most of the other models used in the green paradox literature.
The second model has increasing extraction costs, and in this model the end of the fossil fuel era
is determined by economic exhaustion, rather than physical exhaustion. The third model replaces
the assumption of a backstop energy source, which is a perfect substitute at constant marginal
costs, with an imperfect substitute with decreasing returns to scale. From the first to the last
model, the green paradox step by step erodes. The final section discusses our results and policy
implications.

2. ATMOSHPERIC CO2 ABSORPTION VS RESERVES AND RESOURCES
By 2000, cumulative emissions of CO2 had reached about 440 GtC (1600 GtCO2), and
atmospheric CO2 concentrations were at about 370 ppmv (Allen et al 2009). Annual emissions
related to fossil fuel use were approximately 7 GtC/yr, while CO2 concentrations increased by 1.7
ppmv/yr. We abstract here from deforestation and other greenhouse gases, which also provide a
substantial contribution to global warming. Allen et al suggest that, in order to maintain a high
probability that global mean temperatures will not increase by more than 2 degrees Celsius,
compared to 1900, we should keep atmospheric concentrations well below 500 ppmv (excl. other
greenhouse gases), and cumulative emissions below 1000 GtC. The implication of this target is
that cumulative emissions from 2010 onwards should stay well below 500 GtC. Similar
conclusions have been derived by Kharecha and Hansen (2008).
We now confront the absorption capacity with global oil and fossil fuel reserves and
resources. As fossil fuel combustion is not the only source of emissions, we should exploit strictly
less then 500 GtC of our global oil and fossil fuel resources. Kharecha and Hansen report that
proven conventional oil reserves slightly exceed cumulative historic emissions, and with expected
resources to be discovered, they amount to between 120 and 250 GtC. For gas, proven plus
expected reserves exceed cumulative historic use by more, amounting to between 70 and 140
GtC. Thus, in the optimistic case, when oil and gas location and extraction techniques further
improve, as they did in the 20th century, conventional oil plus gas alone may take up the largest
share of the atmospheric absorption capacity. This optimistic oil and gas recovery scenario is
considered most likely by some experts (Maugeri 2009). Coal reserves are estimated between
about 500 and 1,000 GtC. Finally, there is a highly uncertain but potentially very large resource
of unconventional oil such as tar sands and shale oil, between 150 and 1,000 GtC. The picture
that emerges sketches a problem rather different from the usual worry for scarce oil. The reserves
of oil plus other fossil fuels is probably too much, more than is good for climate change.
We should not exploit all fossil fuel resources that the earth provides, unless we find
ways to capture and store the carbon dioxide, safely and very much at a large-scale. Though the
carbon capture and storage (CCS) lobby is optimistic, it seems still too early to accept CCS as a
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proven solution to the climate change problem. We must therefore ask ourselves which fossil fuel
resources we best leave unused. Gas provides relative high amounts of energy per unit of
emissions, does not contribute to local air pollution as much as the other fuels, and is thus the
most likely candidate to be fully exploited. Oil has always been the currency of fossil fuels. The
combined storage and energy density qualities of petrol, its main product, make it the prime fuel
for transport. It therefore seems logical to exploit most of the conventional oil resources as well.
The choice in favour of conventional oil and gas puts the burden on coal and
unconventional oil. Coal has a very high emission level per energy use, but nonetheless is the
main fuel for power plants world wide. It is a cheap resource, partly because the market
understands that it is not scarce in the same way as oil and gas. The basic calculations above
suggest that we will have to phase out the use of coal during the 21st century, or fully complement
it with CCS, to prevent climate change slipping out of hand. The main driving force for the
required transition cannot be physical exhaustion of coal, but must either be a price wedge
attached to its use, the development of a competitive non-carbon energy substitute, or a
combination of both. Unconventional oil, finally, has stacked the odds against it, if we take
climate change seriously. The processing of tar sands and other non-conventional oil types, to
make petrol and other end-use fuel, is in itself very energy-intensive. The emissions per final
energy supply are thus far above those for gas and conventional oil. Unless complemented with
CCS, unconventional oil seems best left aside.
The above discussion on fossil fuel resources and the atmospheric absorption capacity
leaves out the geopolitical dimension. A coordinated global effort to constrain climate change
may leave almost unchanged the economic value of conventional oil and gas resources, while
coal and unconventional oil owners will see the value of their assets substantially reduced
(Persson et al 2007, Johansson et al 2009). Countries such as Canada, which possesses huge tar
sands deposits, may oppose international measures that suppress the value of their resources.3
The international distribution of costs and benefits of climate change policy is possibly the core
problem to be resolved before effective global action can be expected, and hence this problem
cannot be dismissed. Yet it is outside the realm of this paper. The main point that we want to
bring from the above discussion to our economic analysis below is that if we want to constrain
climate change to remain below levels that most scientists consider dangerous, we cannot allow
fossil fuel resources to be physically fully exhausted. The reasons for the economy to move from
fossil fuels to other energy sources must lie with profit incentives, and not with physical
exhaustion.

3. GREEN PARADOX MODELS
Model 1. Fixed resource, perfect backstop
The base model in which the green paradox arises is fairly simple. Consider an exhaustible
resource, competitively supplied with initial stock S 0, flow extraction qt, and constant extraction
costs ζ. Resource owners maximize the net present value (NPV) of supply,


   e rt ( pt   )qt dt ,

(1)

0

where pt is the real price of the resource and r is the real interest rate, subject to the resource stock
constraint

3

In energy content, Canadian tar sands may rival the Saudi Arabian oil reserves.
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 qt dt  S0 .

(2)

0

Each point in time, the resource market is in equilibrium so that supply is equal to demand
specified through a continuous demand function q t =D(pt ), decreasing in real prices pt.
Maximum demand is labeled α=D(0), while the choke price is labeled β: D(β)=0. Furthermore,
there is a perfect substitute for the resource, available at infinite supply at constant marginal costs
ψ, with ζ<ψ<β. A substitute with these characteristics is typically called a backstop. It is well
known from theory that in this competitive resource economy, the resource price consists of two
elements, the extraction costs and the rent λ t . The latter increases exponentially with the real
interest rate:
pt    e rt 0 .

(3)

Notice that the net present value resource rent is given by Π = λ 0 S 0 . Supply is strictly positive as
long as the resource is cheaper than the backstop. As prices increase exponentially, at some future
termination data t = T, prices will equal the backstop price, p t = ψ , and demand will drop to zero.
The equilibrium is thus fully determined by the NPV rent variable λ 0 through
T

rt
 D (  e 0 )dt  S0 ,

(4)

0

with the termination date T given by
rT = ln( ψ – ζ ) – ln( λ 0 ).

(5)

Before we will analyze the effects of a cheaper backstop (lower ψ), we will define climate change
damages and the green paradox. Climate change damages are captured through a shadow price on
emissions, θ t. The net present value of damages is given by


   e  rtt qt dt

(6)

0

In the context of the green paradox, an important assumption we make here is that early
emissions cause more damages than delayed emissions, thus e  rtt decreases over time.
Restated, we assume that the marginal damage per emissions increases with less than the interest
rate. This assumption can be shown to be consistent with typical climate and damage dynamics
(Hoel and Kverndokk 1996).
We now have all tools to define the weak and strong green paradox. The weak green paradox
occurs when an improvement in the backstop technology (dψ<0) raises current emissions:
d q 0 /d ψ <0. The strong green paradox occurs when net present value damages increase,
d Γ /d ψ <0.
Notably, we do not consider the effects on overall welfare. In general, a cheaper energy
source, whether it is fossil fuel or an alternative, will increase the consumer’s surplus and reduce
the resource owner’s surplus, but the former will outweigh the latter. However, here we are
interested in a situation where there is an externality, climate change associated with the use of
the resource, that is not internalized in the market through appropriate Pigouvian taxes. We could
assume that the market in combination with the standard research policies ensures that
innovations are sufficiently stimulated to implement an efficient level of technology, apart from
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the effect of the technology on climate change. The green policy under consideration stimulates
the innovations in clean energy sources, and the belief is that this innovation may provide an
environmental payoff. If this is the case, the development of clean energy sources needs support
above the typical support for generic innovations. A strong green paradox then means that such
support is not warranted. The green paradox thus does not suggest that innovations do not
increase welfare, but only that there is no added environmental dividend.
For this simple model, we can easily show that both the weak and strong green paradox
occur.
PROPOSITION 1. In the competitive resource model with constant extraction costs and a backstop,
(4)-(5)-(6), both the weak and strong green paradox arise.
We outline the proof here, provide intuition, and refer to the appendix for the details. We first
observe that when the rent λ 0 increases, demand decreases at every point in time, and as total
cumulative demand must match the stock S0 (4), it follows that the termination date T must
increase. Thus d T /d λ 0 >0. Combining this insight with the termination date equation (5), we can
see a more competitive backstop technology (lower ψ) to lead to lower resource rents and an
earlier termination date. The lower rent implies lower prices and higher demand so that the weak
green paradox immediately follows.

T* T

e–rtθt
Δqt

+
–

t

FIGURE 1. Strong green paradox in the base climate-resource model
Let us use variables without asterisk for the benchmark equilibrium, and variables with an
asterisk for an equilibrium with a cheaper backstop. The above analysis informs us that qt*  qt ,
for t < T * < T . We define the change in supply brought about by the cheaper backstop by
qt  qt*  qt , over [0,T], so that Δ q t >0 on [0, T * ], and Δ q t <0 on [ T * , T ]. That is, the cheaper
backstop increases emissions until T*, and decreases emissions afterwards. Figure 1 shows a
typical path for Δ q t . Since future emissions are valued less then present emissions, the net
present value of Δ q t is positive, thus damages increase. Lemma 1 in the appendix provides the
technical proof.
Model 2. Resource with increasing extraction costs, perfect backstop

We argued in the previous section that for climate change to be contained in a safe window we
cannot let all fossil fuels be physically exhausted. That is, we need to either support the transition
to the alternative energy source through a tax on the carbon-emitting resource, or we need to
bring down the costs of the backstop to such levels that it successfully competes with the fossil
fuels. But not only costs of the alternative energy may come down, we may also expect resource
extraction costs to go up when we start to squeeze more oil from existing wells and when non-
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conventional oils become developed. In our simple model, we will now focus on the occurrence
of the green paradox when extraction costs increase with cumulative resource extraction. We
assume that marginal costs are linear in cumulative supply:

 t   st ,

(7)

where the state variable st is cumulative extraction:
t

st   q d .

(8)

0

The competitive resource owners maximize the net present value of revenues, for given prices,
subject to the above marginal costs equations. The present-value Hamiltonian for this problem is4

H  ( pt   st ) qt  t qt

(9)

The first-order condition for supply qt provides the same condition as above: prices are
decomposed in extraction costs and a rent component p t = ζ t + λ t . The first-order condition for the
state variable defines the shadow price dynamics:

t  r t   qt

(10)

The equilibrium is defined by the initial value λ 0 such that at some terminal date T , the resource
price equals the backstop price while the rent is zero: λ T =0 and ηs T = ψ . For convenience of the
analysis, we assume linear demand q t = α (1– p t / β ). The equilibrium is now characterized as a
two-dimensional linear dynamic system

 st  t
)

s  
t  r t   (1  t t )

st   (1 

(11)
(12)

In the appendix, we show that the dynamic differential system has steady state (s*,λ*)=(β/η,0),
one stable eigenvector that is downward sloping, and one unstable eigenvector that is also
downwards sloping but steeper. In Figure 2, point A is the initial state (s 0 , λ 0 ) with s 0 =0, λ 0 >0.
Point B is the steady state, and vector AB is the stable eigenvector of system (11)-(12). Vector BC
is the unstable eigenvector. Arrow AC is a solution to the dynamic system, but it is not an
equilibrium as it doesn’t satisfy the termination date condition. Arrow AD is a solution to the
dynamic system and it describes an equilibrium path with at the termination date ηs T =ψ<β. 5

4

We take the negative dual variable for the stock to have λ t > 0 .
The general pattern of the dynamic system (11)-(12) is a series of paths that for t→∞ asymptotically
converge to the unstable eigenvector BC or –BC, while for t→– ∞ the paths asymptotically come from the
stable eigenvector AB or –AB.
5
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C

A

λt

D
ψ/ζ

st

B
β/η

FIGURE 2. Equilibrium with backstop and increasing extraction costs
What we see in the figure (and formally prove in the appendix) is that when ψ decreases, D
moves to the left and A moves down. That is, the rent λ 0 decreases with a cheaper backstop, so
that initial supply q0 increases. The weak green paradox occurs. While the advancement of
emissions increases the net present value damages, cumulative supply is equal to ψ/β, and thus
decreases with a cheaper backstop. The balance of the two effects determines whether the strong
green paradox applies as well. We prove in the appendix and state here:
PROPOSITION 2. In the competitive resource model with linear demand, extraction costs linearly
increasing in cumulative supply and a backstop, the weak green paradox arises, but the strong
green paradox does not arise.
The proposition marks an important difference with the basic model. When fossil fuel extraction
costs increase with cumulative output, a cheaper backstop will shorten the life-time of fossil fuels
sufficiently to decrease the net present value of damages associated with their use. For the case of
a cheap backstop, the result is obvious. When the backstop becomes very cheap, ψ converges to
zero, and cumulative fossil fuel use becomes very small. As cumulative fossil fuel use sets an
upper bound on climate change damages, these must become small as well. The proposition states
that this mechanism is strong enough to neutralize the strong green paradox, even for a costly
backstop.
It is natural to ask whether the strong green paradox occurs in intermediate cases between the
standard model with constant extraction costs and the model with linearly increasing extraction
costs. We do not provide the full formal analysis but graphically discuss the case through Figure
3. It shows the NPV damages as a function of the costs of the backstop. The top solid line A
presents the base model with constant extraction costs. Damages are strictly increasing with a
cheaper backstop (decreasing ψ). The central solid line C presents the second model with linearly
increasing extraction costs. Damages are decreasing with a cheaper backstop.
When extraction costs are convex in cumulative supply, we will have an intermediate case as
portrayed in the dashed line B.. Such a scenario may be considered realistic when we assume that
there is no good energy alternative to fossil fuels and extraction costs will rapidly increase during
the transition phase towards substitute energy sources. The idea is that the transition phase is
characterized by quickly deteriorating quality of oil wells and other fossil fuels. Damages are
increasing with a cheaper backstop when the backstop is just competitive (ψ close to β, high
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energy prices during the transition), and decreasing when the backstop becomes cheap (ψ close to
zero, moderate energy prices during the transition).

A
B
Γ

C
D
ψ

β

FIGURE 3. NPV damages dependence on costs of backstop. Solid line for linear extraction costs.
Dashed line A for convex, line B for concave extraction costs.
The more optimistic line D represents the case when extraction costs are concave. This
assumption describes a scenario where we assume that the transition phase is characterized by a
switch from coal (with relatively flat extraction costs) to non-carbon energy sources. Damages are
then strictly decreasing with a better backstop.
Model 3. Fixed resource, imperfect substitute
The second model relaxed Model 1’s assumption of a fixed resource stock that would be fully
exhausted, describing economic exhaustion rather than physical exhaustion as the main feature of
the transition. We now address another aspect, the perfect backstop. As Pacala and Socolow
(2004) nicely portrayed, there is not one energy source that can easily replace oil and the other
fossil fuels. To support its need for energy, human kind will require a whole range of renewable
energy sources based on wind, solar, geo-thermal heat, waves, tides, and nuclear. The renewable
energy sources require specific geographic conditions, and a limited number of good sites will
cause a large-scale employment to bring decreasing returns to scales. Therefore, it is not realistic
to assume an energy supply with constant marginal costs at infinite supply, as modelled through
the backstop. A stylized more realistic model would consider marginal costs ψ0 for the first unit
of the substitute energy source, increasing with ψ′ for every additional unit of energy.
In addition, renewable energy sources are not a perfect substitute for fossil fuels. First, wind
and solar are intermittent, and when applied at large scale they need back up storage facilities.
Second, most renewables are typically used to produce electricity, but need a conversion to
produce a liquid energy carrier as typically used in transport. One way to model the imperfect
substitution would be through distinguishing between primary and effective final energy supply.
Every additional unit of primary renewable energy adds a smaller amount to the effective final
energy supply. Stated the other way around, to add one effective unit of final energy requires an
increased amount of primary renewable energy. Consequently, marginal costs increase. The
above model with initial marginal costs ψ0 and increasing marginal costs ψ′ can thus conveniently
be used to describe both decreasing returns to scale in production and imperfect substitution. In
this setting, there are two different improvements possible for the substitute energy source. A
better substitute can mean that either the minimum marginal costs for the substitute ψ0 decrease,
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or that the slope of marginal costs ψ′ decrease, and as we will see, both features have the same
effect.
With decreasing returns to scale, total demand is met jointly by resource supply and
substitute supply:
D( pt )  qt 

pt   0
,
'

(13)

where the second term on the right-hand side is the substitute supply function. Cumulative
demand for the resource is given by
T

 D( pt ) 

0

pt   0
dt  S0 .
'

(14)

The termination date T satisfies qT=0:

 ' D(  0 e rT )    0 e rT   0 .

(15)

The cumulative resource constraint ensures that when the substitute becomes cheaper (ψ0 and/or
ψ′ falls), then the NPV rent λ 0 tends to decrease to lift demand for the resource at every time, and
the sale interval period T tends to increase. The termination date equation suggests that when the
substitute becomes cheaper, the NPV rent decreases, and the termination date T comes forward
(that is, T falls). The common factor in both equations is that the NPV rent λ 0 drops. The cheaper
substitute eats away the revenues for the resource owners, as one expects. In the appendix, we
assume linear demand and then prove this feature. We furthermore show (in the appendix) that
the cheaper substitute reduces resource demand throughout equilibrium and lengthens the interval
period over which the resource is used. Thus, neither the weak nor the strong green paradox
arises.
PROPOSITION 3. In the competitive resource model with linear demand, constant extraction costs,
a substitute energy source with minimal marginal costs below the constant resource extraction
costs, and increasing marginal costs, the weak and strong green paradox do not arise.

4. DISCUSSION
The coming decades will be central for the world to decide on the structures of global future
energy supply. We will need to develop substitute energy sources to compensate the drop in
cheap oil reserves, and at the same time we need to keep in mind the limited absorption capacity
of the earth atmosphere. The challenges are big on both fronts. Economists have warned policy
makers to be careful in their choices as various climate policy instruments may have unexpected
consequences such as highlighted by the green paradox. In this paper, we have provided
arguments for the position that, precisely because the fossil fuel reserves are too vast to be
allowed to be fully exploited, one type of the green paradox is less likely to occur. Unless we
accept a global carbon pricing mechanism, we will have to develop substitute energy sources that
can compete with coal and non-conventional oil. Given imperfect carbon pricing policies, further
development of such a substitute, leading to lower costs, will probably decrease cumulative fossil
fuel use. Furthermore, as lower costs for non-carbon energy sources will also stimulate current
use of these technologies, due to decreasing returns to scale and imperfect substitution between
energy sources, current fossil fuel demand may also decrease. The green paradox need not arise.
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To conclude, we would like to put our analysis in the context of common sense climate
change policy. It is known from earlier literature that there are several mechanisms available to
reduce emissions: structural change towards less energy-intensive sectors, energy savings, energy
substitution from coal to gas and from fossil fuels to non-carbon energy sources, and carbon
capture and sequestration.6 The above order also more or less provides a ranking from cheap to
expensive options, and from short-term to long-term. The analysis in this paper strengthens the
case that we should first aim at the short-term reduction options, and not mainly focus on longterm solutions. An anticipated reduction in future oil demand may, when not accompanied
measures that also reduce current demand, increase current supply. The cheaper options with both
a short-term and long-term effect may ultimately also be the more effective over the entire
horizon.

APPENDIX. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Notice that, for notational convenience, in this appendix we use shorthand and write θt for the
NPV marginal damage, rather than e – r t θ t . Thus, in the appendix we may write that θt decreases,
while in the main text we say that θt increases with less then the interest rate.
We first prove Proposition 1, the weak and strong green paradox in case of constant
extraction costs and a perfect backstop substitute.

Proof of Proposition 1
We first prove that the weak and strong green paradox arise in case of constant extraction costs
and a perfect backstop substitute. The equilibrium parameters λ0 and T are determined by
equations (4) and (5). Taking full derivates for d λ0 dT as dependent on dψ, we find

T rt

  e D '( pt )dt  d 0  D( pT ) d T  0 .
0

r d T = d ψ /( ψ – ζ ) – d λ 0 / λ 0 .

(16)
(17)

As D '<0, the first equation implies that d λ 0 /d T >0. From the second equation, we can then
conclude that d T /d ψ >0 and d λ 0 /d ψ >0. Thus, consider a benchmark equilibrium, and a
counterfactual denoted by an asterix where costs of the backstop have dropped, ψ * < ψ . The
counterfactual equilibrium has lower prices, p t* < pt, higher demand q t* > qt, and an earlier
termination date T * < T. The following lemma now proves the proposition.
LEMMA 1. Consider two continuous paths q :[0, T ]→ R+ and q* :[0, T * ]→ R+, with
T

T*

0

0

*
+
+
*
 qt dt   qt dt , q T ≥0, q T * ≥0, and a strictly decreasing weight function θt:R →R . Assume

T

T*

0

0

qt  qt* for all t ≤min{ T , T* }, then  t qt dt   t qt*dt .
T

T

0

0

T*

Proof. First, notice that T * < T , because if T * ≥ T then  qt dt   qt*dt   qt*dt , contradicting the
0

qt*

assumption. Let us define the difference between the paths: t   qt where we take qt=0 for
all t > T*. From construction we have, Δ t >0 for t < T* , and Δ t <0 for T * < t < T . The lemma now
6

If these don’t suffice, we need to think about lower economic growth.

12
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper404

12

Gerlagh: Too Much Oil

VERSION OF 13 NOVEMBER 2009
T

T*

T

T*

T

0

0

T*

0

T*

follows from the observation that  t  t dt   t  t dt   t t dt  T *   t dt  T *  t dt  0 .

QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the second proposition, we solve the linear dynamic differential equations (11) and (12).
First, we write the differential equation in vector notation as
 st    / 
     2
 t     / 

 /    st  s* 
.

r   /    t   * 

(18)

It is easy to see that (s*,λ*)=(β/η,0) is a steady state. To analyze the dynamics around the
steady state, we need to calculate the two eigenvalues of the 2x2 matrix, μ1 and μ2 that satisfy the
characteristic equation
P ( i )  i2  r i 

r



0

(19)

From the observation that P(0)<0 we conclude that there is one stable eigenvector with μ 1 <0, and
one unstable eigenvector with μ 2 >0. The steady state thus exhibits saddle-point stability. We can
also show that both eigenvectors are downwards sloping. As P(r)<0, μ 2 >r, and as P'(0)<0, we
must have μ 1 +μ 2 >0. Furthermore, the eigenvectors (s 1 ,λ 1 ) and (s 2 ,λ 2 ) must satisfy





 2
si  i  i si  i  



r i
si

(20)

The condition reveals that both eigenvectors are downward sloping, and in (s,λ)-space, the
unstable eigenvector has steeper slope.
The general solution for st is given by the steady state plus exponential deviations along
the eigenvectors
st   /   Be 1t  Ae 2t .

(21)

From the initial condition that s0=0, we have A+B=–β/η, so that we can derive full stock,
supply, and rent paths dependent on only one parameter A:


(1  (1  A)e 1t  Ae 2t ) ,


qt  st  ((1  A) 1e 1t  A2 e 2t ) ,

q


t   (1  t )   st  (1  A)  (1  1 )e 1t  A (1  2 )e 2t .



st 

(22)
(23)
(24)

Termination date is determined by λ T =0, which gives
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(1  A)(  1 )
 e( 2  1 )T
A(   2 )

(25)

Substitution in (22) yields
 1

2

1



2




    1  2  1    1  2  1 

sT  (1  A 2  1 (1  A) 2  1  









   2 
2




(26)



It is clear that for A→0, we have T→∞, and s T →β/η, while sT decreases in A, so that for A>0 we
have T<∞ and s T <β/η. That is, the case of A=0 corresponds to the case that the backstop is too
expensive to be ever used, ψ>β. The initial extraction rate is given by q 0 =βμ 1 /η. The case of a
competitive backstop ψ<β, s T =ψ/η, corresponds with A>0, and with q 0 >βμ 1 /η. Restated, we
can interpret the parameter A (decreasing in ψ) as a proxy for technology.
To allow us to analyze NPV damages in the same fashion, we first assume that marginal
damages increase at a constant rate θ t =e σ t θ 0 with 0<σ<r. At the end we will show that if
damages decrease for all values of 0<σ<r, then damages will decrease for any shadow price path
with decreasing NPV. For the moment, damages are given by
T

   e(  r  )t0 qt dt ,

(27)

0

with σ<r so that NPV marginal damages decreases. Substitution of supply gives (where we use
μ 2 >r)

 


 0  (1  A) 1
A2
1  e(  r   1 )T 
1  e(  r   2 )T  .

  r    1
r    2










(28)

This damage equation can conveniently be rewriting as


  X  (
X Y) A


0
negative

(1  A)

positive


 r   2
2  1

A

positive




r   1
2  1


 r   1
 r   2 







   
  X    1  2 1  Y    1  2 1 


   2 
   2 

 
negative



(29)

where
 1
1
r    1
 2
1
Y
r    2
X

(30)
(31)

We have 0<X,Y<1, and X–Y<0. We can thus conclude that the term (X – Y)A is decreasing in
A. Furthermore, from the characteristic equation, we can derive
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X

Y

r 2  2  22
r 1  1  12

r

 2
2
2
 1 
 1   1 
  1

   r
    
 2 
 1  2    2     2
2

(32)



with equality when σ=0. The last term between square brackets in (29) is thus negative, and as
the coefficients for the terms with A and (1+A) are both positive, so that these terms are
increasing in A. Thus, we have that Γ decreases in A. As A was decreasing in ψ, we have that Γ is
increasing in ψ.
The above analysis ensured that damages would decrease for any damage parameter path θt
with constant growth rate less than the interest rate. As a reference we will evaluate the damages
at constant current shadow prices, that is, NPV shadow prices decrease with the interest rate. The
lemma below then proves that damages will also decrease if we use a damage parameter path θt
that strictly grows but with less than the interest rate. Recall that if the backstop becomes cheaper,
ψ drops to ψ*, then cumulative supply decreases by the termination date condition ηs T =ψ.
T*

T

LEMMA 2. Consider two continuous paths q:[0,T]→ R and q :[0,T ]→ R ,  qt dt   qt*dt ,
+

q T ≥0, q

*

*

*

+

T * ≥0,

+

+

0

*

0

and two strictly decreasing weight functions θt:R →R and θ , with θ*/θ
T

T*

0

0

increasing. Furthermore, assume qt  qt* for all t≤min{T, T*}, and  t qt dt   t qt*dt . Then
T

T*

0

0

we have as well  t*qt dt   t*qt*dt
Proof. It is obvious that T*<T. Without loss of generality, we scale θ* such that T**  T * It is
T*

T

T*

T

0

T*

0

T*

now immediate that  t* (qt*  qt )dt   t*qt dt   t (qt*  qt )dt   t qt dt  0
QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
For the third proposition it turns out convenient to rewrite demand as a function of the rent
qt  a (1 

t
b

),

with substituted parameters a   (1 

(33)
a
 0 
)
and b 
. The transformation of
 /   1 / '

'

the demand function is allowed because p t >ζ>ψ 0. We will see that ∂Γ/∂a>0 and ∂Γ/∂b=0. After
we have shown that how damages depend on a and b, the proposition follows from the
observation that ∂a/∂ψ0>0 and ∂a/∂ψ'>0. Before we can analyze ∂Γ/∂a and ∂Γ/∂b, we need the
following lemma that formalizes the intuition that if in a counterfactual situation supply increases
faster (or decreases slower) compared to the benchmark, then initial supply must have started at a
lower level, that is, supply is delayed and NPV damages decrease. We notice that an essential
characteristic in this lemma is that supply continuously decreases to zero over time, without a
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sudden drop at the end as is characteristic of the first model. The reason is that the substitute
energy source has an upward sloping, rather than a flat, supply curve.
LEMMA 3. Consider two continuously differentiable paths q:[0,T]→ R+ and q* :[0,T * ]→ R+,
T

T*

0

0

with q T =0, q * T * =0,  qt dt   qt*dt , and a strictly decreasing weight function θt:R+→R+. Assume
T

T*

0

0

qt  qt*  0 for all t≤min{T, T*}, then  t qt dt   t qt*dt .
Proof. First, notice that T * >T, because if T * ≤T
qt 

qt*

 0 implies qt 

qt*

then qT *  0; qT* *  0 , which together with
T

T*

0

0

T*

for all t<T , so that  qt dt   qt dt   qt*dt , contradicting the
*

0

qt*

assumption. Now, define the difference between the paths: t   qt where we take qt=0 for
all t>T. From construction we have, Δ T =q* T>0,  t  0 for t<T, and  t  qt*  0 for T<t<T *.
T

T*

0

T

We have   t dt    qt*dt  0 , which together with continuity of Δt and Δ T >0 implies that Δ0<0
and there is some t* such that Δ t * =0. The difference path is thus negative on [0,t*] and positive
on
[t*,T*],
and
the
lemma
now
follows
from
the
observation
that
T*

t*

T*

t*

T*

0

0

t*

0

t*

 t  t dt   t  t dt   t t dt  t*   t dt  t*   t dt  0 . QED.

We can now prove the parts of the proposition.
LEMMA 4 Given demand as function of rents (33), cumulative supply (2), and competitive pricing
λ t =e r t λ 0 , we have ∂Γ/∂a>0 and ∂Γ/∂b=0.
Proof. At termination date T, λ T =b so that t  be r (t T ) and qt  a (1  e r (t T ) ) . The level of the
adjusted choke price b has no effect on supply, and thus cannot have any effect on damages!
T

Integration over time gives s0   qt dt  a[T  r 1 (1  e  rT )] . Differentiation for T and a implies
0

dT/da<0 and dT/db=0. A higher maximum demand reduces the time window in which demand is
exercised. Differentiation over time of supply gives qt  rae r (t T )  0 . It is clear that
qt
q
dq
 0; t  0 , and thus t  0 . We can now apply lemma 2.
T
a
da
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